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Abstract 
 
Even though there exists an extensive Law and Economics literature on the topics of 
procedural law and harmonization of law, very little has been written on harmonization of 
procedural law as such.  
In this paper I first provide a brief overview of the economic approach to legal intervention, 
private enforcement and procedural law. Subsequently, I discuss the economics of 
harmonization of (substantive) private law. The traditional legal arguments in favor of 
harmonization (differences in legal rules between countries result in legal uncertainty and 
increased costs and therefore hinder cross-border trade, and harmonization would create a 
level playing field) turn out to be unconvincing. The economic analysis of law provides 
several arguments against harmonization (regulatory competition enables satisfying a larger 
number of preferences, it enables learning effects, (centralized) legislators suffer from limited 
information and the possible influence of interest groups should be taken into account) and in 
favor of it (the need to internalize interstate externalities, the desire to avoid a race to the 
bottom, decreasing transaction costs and profiting from economies of scale). These arguments 
have to be weighed in order to reach a conclusion on the desirability of harmonization 
Such a weighing shows that there is, at best, a limited scope for harmonization of procedural 
law (and then only as an additional option). Harmonization would remove the possible 
learning effects and does not allow satisfying a larger number of preferences. The possible 
arguments in favor of harmonization of procedural law seem week, especially now procedural 
law is closely connected to the underlying substantive law. The only potentially strong 
argument is the reduction of transaction costs. It is ultimately an empirical matter if this 
argument outweighs the arguments against harmonization. The 2008 Oxford Civil Justice 
Survey in my view suggests that this is not the case.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Even though there exists an extensive Law and Economics literature on the topics of 
procedural law and harmonization of law, very little has been written on harmonization of 
procedural law as such. In order to be able to assess this topic from an economic perspective, 
it is necessary to start with both separate issues. Without knowledge of the economic 
approach to procedural law and to harmonization, it is impossible to provide an answer to the 
question whether harmonization of procedural law should be striven for. 
In Section 2 I will provide a brief overview of the economic approach to legal intervention in 
general and to private enforcement in particular. After that, in Section 3 I will discuss 
economic literature regarding (civil) procedural law. This Section will make clear that legal 
economists do not focus solely on the dispute resolution function of civil procedures, but also 
on its potential to ‘produce’ legal norms. These norms are not only relevant for the parties 
involved in the procedure, but also for other actors who may derive behavioral guidelines 
from the outcome of this case. This law-producing feature of civil procedures can be regarded 
as a social benefit. However, the parties involved in the procedure are likely more interested 
in their private costs and benefits. In economic terms, civil procedures may create a positive 
externality, so that the private incentives to sue are not perfectly aligned with the social 
optimal incentives. 
In Section 4, I shift my attention to the economic approach to harmonization of law in 
general. Most economic literature on this topic concerns harmonization of substantive law, 
but the arguments which are developed pro and contra harmonization are also relevant in the 
current debate on procedural law. I will therefore discuss the arguments and I will provide 
examples from several fields of substantive law to make clear to what conclusions these 
arguments may lead. 
In Section 5 I will turn to the issue of harmonization of procedural law. I will apply the 
arguments from Section 4 to procedural law, taking into consideration the economic role of 
civil procedure as sketched in Section 3. 
In Section 6, I will conclude. 
 
 
2. The Economic Approach to Law and Private Enforcement 
 
2.1 Reasons for Legal Intervention 
 
In the Law and Economics approach, legal intervention is primarily regarded as a way to try 
to correct various forms of market failure.1 In the theoretical construct of full competition, i.e. 
a perfectly functioning market, social welfare is maximized. In such a market, parties transact 
without transaction costs on the basis of full information, so that entitlements per definition 
end up with the parties who value them the most. Actors incorporate all costs and benefits 
(both to themselves and to others) attached to their behaviour. They therefore only engage in 
an activity if the social costs are lower than the social benefits, so that their activities increase 
social welfare. Furthermore, due to competition, producers have to produce efficiently, 
because otherwise consumers will buy the product from a more efficient and hence cheaper 
competitor. Therefore, resources are not wasted (which would have lowered social welfare). 
 
1 See e.g. C.K. Rowley, ‘Social Sciences and the Law: The Relevance of Economic Theories’, (1) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 1981, p. 401. 
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In reality, several departures from the market form of full competition exist. These market 
failures lower social welfare and form reasons for legal intervention. The first type of market 
failure is market power. In situations where market power exists, the producer(s) is (are) not 
forced to produce efficiently, because the necessary competition is lacking. Producers can 
produce inefficiently, can limit their output to below-competitive levels and can increase 
prices to above-competitive levels. This may result in a situation where consumers who value 
the product higher than its full costs, but lower than its increased price, will not buy the 
product anymore. This results in a loss of welfare. Furthermore, the costs of acquiring and 
maintaining market power as well as the reduced incentive to innovate lower social welfare. 
Competition law can be seen as a legal response to these problems, see for example the 
prohibition on cartel agreements (Article 101 TFEU) and the ban on abuses of dominant 
position (Article 102 TFEU).2
The second type of market failure consists of negative externalities. The behaviour of an actor 
may cause negative consequences for others, such as pollution or risk. If the actor does not 
bear these negative consequences, he does not incorporate these costs into his decision 
whether and if yes, how often to engage in his activity. His decisions, in other words, only 
take his private costs and benefits into account, but not the social costs and benefits. Engaging 
in the activity may therefore decrease rather than increase social welfare. Besides this 
problem of a too high activity level, the actor may also take inadequate precautionary 
measures to reduce the probability and/or the severity of the negative externalities. Various 
legal interventions may lead to internalization of the externality. For example, liability for 
harm caused by an actor may provide him with incentives to decrease the probability and/or 
magnitude of harm occurring, and/or it may incentivize him to reduce his activity level.3
The third type of market failure relates to the available information, which may differ between 
the transacting parties. If one party cannot perfectly monitor the other, the latter may decide to 
shirk, take excessive risks et cetera. This problem of moral hazard is relevant in, for example, 
insurance, where the insured may take less precautionary measures than the uninsured who 
themselves face the possible consequences of their behaviour. Comparably, consumers may 
become less careful in using products if they can sue manufacturers under products liability 
for losses caused by the product. This reduces social welfare, because people do not take the 
correct decisions regarding their behaviour. A second problem caused by information 
asymmetry is called adverse selection.4 In a transaction, one party (for example the seller of a 
product) may know more about the quality of the product than the other party (the buyer) 
does. Given that the buyer does not know if the product is of high or low quality, he may only 
be willing to pay an average price. The seller, who knows the quality of the product, is only 
willing to sell products of at most average quality for this price. This means that the average 
quality of the products which are offered for this price is lower than the average of all 
products and hence the consumer lowers the price which he is willing to pay. This continues 
until only products of low quality are available. Hence, welfare increasing transactions may 
be forgone. Trademarks may ameliorate this problem, because they allow producers or sellers 
of high quality products to signal the quality of their product and they allow buyers to 
recognize products of high quality. Also consumer law can be regarded as a potential solution, 
 
2 See e.g. R.J. Van den Bergh and P.D.N. Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A 
Comparative Perspective, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2006, p. 43ff. 
3 See e.g. S. Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1987. 
4 See e.g. G. Akerlof, ‘The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’, (84) 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1970, pp. 488-500. 
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for example through information duties of the producer or seller, or through the requirement 
of conformity. 
The fourth type of market failures is the fact that so-called collective goods are not produced 
in a private market. Collective goods are non-exclusive (it is not possible, or too expensive, to 
exclude someone from enjoying the good) and non-rivalrous (the use by a person does not 
affect the possibilities for use by others). Producers therefore cannot earn money with the 
good, because potential users who do not want to pay cannot be excluded, and their ability to 
use the good is not affected by the use by others. Information can be regarded as a collective 
good, which shows from for example downloading of music and movies and copying of texts. 
This may result in a lower than socially optimally amount of information being produced, 
because the producer may not be able to recoup the investments. Intellectual property law can 
be seen as a possible solution, because copyrights and patents give the producer of 
information a legal monopoly on the production and sale of the information, which enables 
them to recoup their investments.  
Finally, in reality, transaction costs exist, which may prohibit welfare increasing transactions 
to take place. This implies that entitlements may not end up with the parties who value them 
the most, so that their initial allocation becomes important. Law plays an important role in this 
initial allocation. In addition, law can try to reduce transaction costs, for instance by 
establishing default rules in contract law. Only in case parties want to make a different 
arrangement than the default rules, they need to draw up a more extensive contract. Besides 
reducing the transaction costs, this also reveals private information of the party who wants to 
deviate from the default, which reduces the information asymmetry. 
 
 
2.2 Private Enforcement 
 
Section 2.1 showed the economic rationale behind various bodies of law. In order for these 
legal rules to fulfill their role, it is necessary that they are enforced and that violations are 
sanctioned. The expected sanction is the instrument which may induce the potential violator 
to refrain from his potentially welfare-lowering behaviour. 
The economic literature regarding optimal enforcement analyzes under which conditions 
public enforcement may be better and when private enforcement is to be preferred. For 
example, anticompetitive behaviour can be targeted by the relevant competition authority in a 
public procedure, but alternatively the victims of this behaviour may start a civil procedure. 
Negative externalities may be handled through administrative law, criminal law and/or tax 
law, but also via private tort claims. 
An important factor in the choice between public and private enforcement is the 
(un)availability of information regarding a norm violation and regarding the identity of the 
wrongdoer. If private parties have good information regarding these issues, it is not desirable 
to choose for (more expensive) public enforcement.5 In a typical tort case, the victim knows 
that there was a norm violation and he also knows the identity of the wrongdoer.6 This 
information is often not available to a public enforcer. Furthermore, the victim has an 
incentive to utilize his information, if he wants to claim damages. In case of a breach of safety 
 
5 R.J. Van den Bergh and L.T. Visscher, ‘Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law’, in: R.V. de Mulder (ed.), 
Mitigating Risk in the Context of Safety and Security. How relevant is a rational approach?, Rotterdam: 
Erasmus University 2008, p. 39. 
6 W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, ‘The Private Enforcement of Law’, (4) Journal of Legal Studies 1975, p. 31; S. 
Shavell, ‘The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement’, (36) Journal of Law and Economics 1993, p. 267. 
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regulation, private parties often lack the necessary information, so that public enforcement 
may be desirable. The public enforcer may build up expertise in the relevant area and may 
benefit from economies of scale in investigating possible violations.7 The same holds for the 
area of competition law.8 If representative actions are allowed, also private organizations may 
build up the necessary expertise or benefit from economies of scale.9 Often a mix of public 
and private enforcement is needed to reach the best outcome. 
A second relevant aspect in the choice between public and private enforcement is the question 
whether the enforcer receives socially desirable incentives in his decision whether or not to 
start a legal procedure. Generally speaking, private parties will be more interested in their 
private costs and benefits of litigation than in the public costs and benefits. Given that others 
than the parties involved may benefit from the outcome of a certain case (a point to which I 
will return in Section 3), private parties may prefer others to bear the costs of litigation. They 
may, in other words, want to take a free ride on the efforts of others. However, if too many 
people behave as free riders, there may be no civil procedure to start with, which would be an 
argument in favor of public enforcement. Furthermore, if the expected private benefits of a 
case are relatively small (for example because the wrongdoer is insolvent so that he cannot 
pay full damages or because every individual victim has only suffered a small loss), private 
parties may decide not to start a lawsuit (they then remain rationally apathetic). If insolvency 
is the cause of the problem, public enforcement may be called for. If scattered losses are the 
cause of the problem, besides public enforcement, allowing collective (damages)actions may 
be a solution. However, given that rational victims are not willing to pre-finance legal 
counsel, introduction of a form of result-based remuneration will be necessary then. 
Alternatively, allowing a victim to recover more than only his losses (hence, punitive 
damages) may overcome the problem of victims staying rationally apathetic.10
 
 
3. The Economics of Civil Procedures in a Nutshell 
 
3.1 The Social Goal of Civil Procedures 
 
In Section 2.1, the social goal of law from an economic perspective became clear: 
ameliorating the problems caused by different forms of market failure. Section 2.2 briefly 
discussed the choice between public and private enforcement of law and showed that under 
certain conditions, private enforcement is desirable. Viewed from this perspective, the main 
social goal of civil procedures is to enforce legal rules which address the issues caused by 
market failures. For example, collective actions in antitrust cases instigated by consumers or 
competitors of the infringer(s) serve the goal to bring the anticompetitive behaviour to a halt 
and to deter the defendant(s) and others from engaging in such behaviour. Tort cases for 
damages or injunctions equally aim to stop the tort from continuing and to deter this and other 
tortfeasors from subsequent tortious acts. They also may clarify the applicable behavioural 
 
7 S. Shavell, ‘Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety’, (13) Journal of Legal Studies 1984, p. 359. 
8 R. Van den Bergh and S.E. Keske, ‘Private Enforcement of European Competition Law: Quo Vadis?’, (3) 
European Review of Contract Law 2007, p. 471ff. 
9 See e.g. S.E. Keske, Group Litigation in European Competition Law, Mortsel: Intersentia Publishers 2010 
(forthcoming). 
10 See e.g. W.P.J. Wils, ‘Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?’, (26) World 
Competition 2003, p. 476 regarding treble damages in competition law and L.T. Visscher, ‘Economic Analysis 
of Punitive Damages’, in: H. Koziol and V. Wilcox (eds), Punitive Damages: Common Law and Civil Law 
Perspectives, Vienna: Springer 2009, pp. 219-236 for a general economic approach to punitive damages. 
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norms, e.g. because the court provides more information on how to concretize the negligence 
standard in certain circumstances. Contract cases in which damages or specific performance is 
being requested on the basis of breach of contract reinforce the norm that contractual parties 
(not only those involved in the procedure, but also others) should live up to their contractual 
obligations, or internalize the negative consequences in case they don’t. Copyright and patent 
cases protect the legal monopoly which was granted to the holder in order to provide adequate 
incentives for production of information. Trademark cases protect the instrument with which 
producers can signal quality to overcome the problem of adverse selection. Hence, in all these 
cases, there is a clear social goal which is served: increasing social welfare by solving the 
problems caused by market failures. 
However, as became clear in Section 2.2, the parties involved in civil litigation have private 
goals which may be ill-aligned with the social goals. A typical plaintiff in a tort case, for 
instance, likely is more interested in receiving damages than in deterring potential tortfeasors 
or clarifying the applicable behavioural norms. Likewise, private enforcers of competition law 
may be more interest in the direct (financial) outcome of the case than in deterring others 
from anticompetitive behavior. To put it in more general terms, the parties involved in a civil 
procedure may be more interested in the dispute resolution aspect of civil litigation, whereas 
the economic approach to civil litigation stresses a different function of civil litigation: 
contributing to the production of legal norms which help to tackle the problems caused by 
market failures. The legal approach is more ex post, looking back to the case at hand, whereas 
the economic approach is more ex ante, focusing on future behaviour. There are, of course, 
also cases which do not have merits beyond the case at hand, such as uncontested pecuniary 
claims. There the difference between private and social gains is much less important. 
The fact that civil procedures may produce the above-described positive externalities (clearer 
guidelines for behavior, general deterrence, et cetera) implies that there may be a social value 
of litigation which goes beyond the private value of conflict resolution.11 It is therefore 
important that civil litigation does not become too costly for potential plaintiffs (both in terms 
of money and time) because otherwise substantive law will not be enforced adequately and 
hence cannot provide the desirable incentives. 
 
 
3.2 Minimizing Costs 
 
Economic analysis of civil procedure centers on the issue how different procedures affect the 
sum of direct costs and error costs and how they influence the behaviour of the parties 
involved in the dispute resolution process.12 The latter topic will be discussed in Section 3.3 
below. 
Direct costs are the costs of adjudication itself, so the time invested by the various actors 
involved (parties, lawyers, judges, (expert) witnesses), their wages, as well as the material 
costs (offices, office supplies, et cetera). Error costs emerge when wrong decisions are taken, 
because the substantive law then does not provide the correct incentives (for instance cases 
 
11 See e.g. S. Shavell, ‘The Fundamental Difference between the Private and Social Motive to Use the Legal 
System’, (26) Journal of Legal Studies 1997, pp. 575-612 and S. Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of 
Law, Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2004, p. 283 ff. 
12 See for early literature e.g. W.M. Landes, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Courts’, (14)  Journal of Law and 
Economics 1971, pp. 61-107 and R.A. Posner, ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial 
Administration’, (2) Journal of Legal Studies 1973, pp. 399-458. For an overview, see B.H. Kobayashi and J.S. 
Parker, ‘Civil Procedure: General’, in: B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics, Volume V. The Economics of Crime and Litigation, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2000, pp. 1-26. 
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where liability is warranted but due to e.g. problems of proving causation, liability is not 
imposed). There exists a trade-off between both types of costs. The more resources are 
invested in the procedure, for instance in hearing witnesses, the lower the probability of 
wrong decisions may become, so that direct costs increase while error costs decrease. The 
economic goal is to strike a balance between both types of costs so that the sum of error costs 
and direct costs is minimized. Quicker, cheaper procedures therefore have the benefit that 
they save on direct costs, but if the quality of the resulting rulings decreases, the overall 
assessment may still be negative. After all, if more errors are made, the behavioural incentives 
provided by the legal system are of a lower quality, which may result in more undesirable 
behaviour taking place. In addition, the direct costs of the legal system may increase after all, 
if lower-quality decisions (meaning, less in conformity with the desired outcome) are more 
often appealed than higher quality decisions. Another important possible drawback of cheap 
and quick procedures is that the number of legal claims will probably increase. After all, the 
price of litigation goes down (both in terms of money and of time) and the law of demand 
then predicts an increase in demand. Especially in cases where the social value of litigation is 
limited, such an increase is undesirable. 
An important procedural ‘instrument’ with which both direct costs and error costs are 
influenced, is the burden of proof. From an economic point of view, many factors are relevant 
in deciding who should bear the burden of proof.13 Obviously, the costs of producing 
evidence are important. If it is cheaper for the plaintiff to prove the presence of something 
(such as negligence, breach of contract, anticompetitive behaviour, existence of a debt, or 
more general the presence of a factor ‘X’) than it is for the defendant to prove the absence of 
X, then it makes sense to put the burden of proof on the plaintiff. However, also the a priori 
possibility that factor X is present should be included. If X is an unlawful act, given the 
assumption that most people do not behave unlawfully, the probability that X is present is 
much lower than the probability that X is not present. In that case, even if the costs of proving 
the presence of X may outweigh the costs of proving the absence of X, it still makes sense to 
put the burden of proof on the plaintiff. After all, if the burden of proof would be put on the 
defendant while it is unlikely that he has acted unlawfully, direct costs increase because the 
absence of X has to be proven in many cases, and error costs increase dramatically in the 
cases where the defendant cannot prove the absence of X. For example, if a plaintiff sues 
someone for damages for drunk driving, the costs of proving either drunkenness or soberness 
may be comparable (in both cases, a breath or blood test may be required) or may be even 
lower for the defendant (he can ask witnesses to testify about where he has been before the 
accident, while the plaintiff does not have that information). However, given that the vast 
majority of people do not drive while being drunk, it still makes sense to put the burden of 
proof on the plaintiff. It is also important to include available information which affects the a 
priori assessment of the probability that X is present. For example, if our defendant smells of 
alcohol, drives erratically and has bloodshot eyes, given that (the combination of) these 
factors occur much more often in case a person is drunk than in cases where he is not drunk, it 
makes sense to reverse the burden of proof.  
Obviously, a procedural issue such as the burden of proof, as well as the level of certainty 
required, is strongly influenced by the underlying substantive law. I will return to this issue of 
the interconnection between procedural law and substantive law in Section 5. 
 
 
 
13 See e.g. B.L. Hay and K.E. Spier, ‘Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective’, (26) 
Journal of Legal Studies 1997, p. 418. 
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3.3 Influencing Behaviour in the Dispute Resolution Process 
 
The dominant economic model of dispute resolution (the ‘expected value model of 
adjudication’) evaluates the impact of procedural rules in different phases of the process. The 
parties involved in litigation make an assessment of the expected (private) costs and benefits 
in which they incorporate their beliefs on the probability of success. This assessment 
determines whether they file a claim, whether they proceed with a claim or drop it after new 
information becomes available during the dispute resolution process, whether they are willing 
to make or accept a settlement offer or whether they proceed to the actual trial and if yes, how 
much they spend on litigation.14
It goes beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these insights in detail, but the example of 
the way in which the litigation costs are divided over plaintiff and defendant may be 
instructive to illustrate the line of reasoning. Under the English Rule, the prevailing party 
recovers some or all litigation costs from the unsuccessful party while under the American 
Rule, each party bears its own expenses. Under the English Rule parties are expected to spend 
more on litigation than under the American Rule, now there is more at stake.15 Furthermore, 
the higher the subjective assessment of success of the plaintiff, the more likely he is to sue. 
This effect is stronger under the English Rule, because a successful plaintiff under this rule 
does not bear the (full) litigation costs. This implies that the English rule creates a selection 
effect in the direction of high-merit claims. In addition, the more risk averse a plaintiff is, the 
less likely he is to sue. This effect is stronger under the English Rule because the stakes there 
also include the litigation costs of the other party. The effect on settlement is unclear. On the 
one hand, the ‘greater expenditure effect’ makes settlements more attractive, because 
litigation is expected to become more expensive. On the other hand, the tendency of parties to 
overestimate their probability of success reduces the incentive to settle under the English 
Rule. Empirical research suggests that this over-optimism effect dominates.16 The overall 
impact on the total duration of claims in unclear. Information that becomes available during 
the procedure which shows a lower quality of the claim than originally expected will lead to a 
sooner dropping of the claim than under the American Rule, because the plaintiff runs the risk 
of having to bear the litigation costs of the defendant as well. The settlement stage is also 
expected to take shorter, because of the selection effect towards higher quality claims. 
However, cases which are not settled are expected to take longer in the adjudication phase due 
to the greater-expenditure effect. 
The economic literature on the dispute resolution process also studies the impact of issues 
such as fee arrangements (no cure no pay, quota pars litis, no win less fee, et cetera) and 
possibilities of collective actions. All these issues turn out to be interrelated and they are also 
connected to other issues, such as the availability of legal expense insurance (after the event 
or before the event) or subsidized legal aid. The relevance of all these issues for this paper is 
 
14 See e.g. S. Shavell, ‘Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the 
Allocation of Legal Costs’, (11) Journal of Legal Studies 1982, pp. 55-81; R.D. Cooter and D.L. Rubinfeld, 
‘Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’, (27) Journal of Economic Literature 1989, pp. 
1067-1097; J.W. Hughes and E.A. Snyder, ‘Litigation and Settlement under the English and American Rules: 
Theory and Evidence’, (38) Journal of Law and Economics 1995, pp. 225-250; A.F. Daughety, ‘Settlement’, in: 
B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume V. The Economics of Crime 
and Litigation, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2000, pp. 95-158; Kobayashi and Parker 2000. 
15 A.W. Katz, ‘Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?’, (3) Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization 1987, p. 159 ff. 
16 E.A. Snyder and J.W. Hughes, ‘The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory’, (6) 
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization (1990), p. 366. 
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that procedural law may affect the parties involved in litigation in many interrelated ways. 
This implies that proposals for harmonization, which change the current procedural law, 
should be thought through very carefully, in order to avoid adverse effects. In addition, it is 
important to keep in mind that the incentives provided through the rules of civil procedure are 
also influenced by the underlying substantive law and issues such as the availability of legal 
expense insurance and subsidized legal aid, the question whether collective actions are 
allowed, et cetera. I will return to this issue in Section 5, where I will argue that the 
connection between substantive and procedural law is an issue which should be carefully 
considered in the debate regarding harmonization of procedural law. Before returning to that 
point, in Section 4 I will discuss the economic approach to harmonization of private law in 
general. 
 
 
4. Harmonization of Private Law from an Economic Point of View 
 
4.1 The Limited Value of the Traditional Legal Arguments in Favor of Harmonization 
 
If one reads the economic literature regarding harmonization of law, it quickly becomes clear 
that the traditional legal arguments in favor of harmonization are critically assessed and that 
different arguments in favor of and against harmonization are applied. 
One of the main legal arguments pro harmonization is that differences in legal rules between 
countries result in legal uncertainty and increased costs. This would hinder cross-border trade, 
because the costs of getting informed about the different legal systems may outweigh the 
gains from cross-border trade. And even if there would still be such trade, it has become more 
expensive due to these legal differences. In the words of the European Commission, regarding 
contract law:17
 
‘For consumers and SMEs in particular, not knowing other contract law regimes may be a disincentive against 
undertaking cross-border transactions. This has been part of the rationale for some existing Community acts 
aimed at improving the functioning of the internal market. Suppliers of goods and services may even therefore 
regard offering their goods and services to consumers in other countries as economically unviable and refrain 
from doing so. (…) 
Moreover, disparate national law rules may lead to higher transaction costs, especially information and possible 
litigation costs for enterprises in general and SMEs and consumers in particular. Contractual parties could be 
forced to obtain information and legal advice on the interpretation and application of an unfamiliar foreign law. 
If the applicable law has been chosen in the contract, this applies to the contractual party whose law has not been 
chosen. (…) 
These higher transaction costs may furthermore be a competitive disadvantage, for example in a situation where 
a foreign supplier is competing with a supplier established in the same country as the potential client.’ 
 
Besides the fact that it remains to be seen if harmonized law indeed would result in more legal 
certainty (problems of different interpretation and application of the legal rules may still result 
in non-uniform law),18 there is no empirical evidence that differences between legal systems 
indeed significantly impede international trade, nor that harmonization of law would result in 
more international transactions. Wagner for instance argues, regarding contract law, that 
 
17 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European Contract 
Law, COM (2001) 398 final, no. 30-32. 
18 Also see J. Smits, ‘Diversity of Contract Law and the European Internal Market’, in: J. Smits (ed.), The Need 
for a European Contract Law. Empirical and Legal Perspectives, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 2005, p. 
179. 
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large, multinational enterprises will not be deterred by differences between legal rules in the 
countries where they are active. They have experience with this problem and they will often 
use local lawyers and incorporate subsidiaries in the different countries to deal with the issue 
of different legal rules.19 For small and medium-size firms this may be different so that in 
theory, the costs of dealing with different legal systems could indeed hinder international 
trade. However, Wagner states that in reality this may not be the case. He provides anecdotal 
evidence on small and medium-size enterprises that are active in many countries all over the 
world. More importantly, business associations representing small and medium-size firms 
during the consultation process on the Commission Communication of European Contract 
Law themselves did not regard full harmonization as a necessary tool to promote competition 
within the common market.20 According to several responses, problems in the functioning of 
the internal market are more caused by language barriers, cultural differences, distance, 
habits, and divergence in other areas of law, such as tax law and, noteworthy, procedural 
law.21
 
A second traditional argument for harmonization is that it would create a ‘level playing field’. 
After all, differences in legal rules between countries could create inequality in competitive 
conditions across member states, so it is argued. There are several reasons why this argument 
is not convincing. The first reason, being that different (groups of) people may prefer different 
rules so that a level playing field is not desirable to start with, will be treated in more detail in 
Section 4.2 below where the economic arguments against harmonization are discussed. In 
addition, in as far as the legal rules in a given jurisdiction hold for all actors in that 
jurisdiction, the playing field within every single jurisdiction already is level. There would 
only be a problem of unequal competitive conditions across member states if foreign actors 
are held to different, more stringent norms than domestic actors. In case of for instance tort 
law or contract law, this problem therefore does not exist. Furthermore, if the goal of 
harmonization is to remove the differences between legal rules of different countries 
altogether, this goal neglects that differences between countries are the basis of international 
trade to start with. Removing such differences may very well reduce social welfare. If legal 
differences enable for instance prices of goods of services to be lower in some jurisdictions, 
this will lower the prices on the international market, which also benefits those in the 
jurisdictions with the stricter rules.22 Finally, harmonization of law will not result in a level 
playing field, because other aspects, such as infrastructure, wages, labor productivity et cetera 
will stay non-harmonized. 
 
 
 
 
 
19 G. Wagner, ‘The Economics of Harmonization: The Case of Contract Law’, (39) Common Market Law 
Review  2002, p. 1014.  Also see Smits 2005, p. 167. 
20 C. Ott and H.-B. Schäfer, ‘Die Vereinheitlichung des europäischen Vertragsrecht – Ökonomische 
Notwendigkeit oder akademisches Interesse?’, in: C. Ott and H.-B. Schäfer (eds), Vereinheitlichung und 
Diversität des Zivilrechts in transnationalen Wirtschaftsräumen, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2002, p. 213; Wagner 
2002, p. 1015; Smits 2005, p. 170. 
21 Smits 2005, p. 170. 
22 See e.g. A. Ogus, ‘Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis To 
Comparative Law’, (48) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 1999, p. 417; R.J. Van den Bergh and L.T. 
Visscher, ‘The Principles of European Tort Law: The Right Path to Harmonization?’, (14) European Review of 
Private Law 2006, p. 515. 
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4.2 Economic Arguments Against Harmonization 
 
1. Satisfying a Greater Number of Preferences 
 
The starting point of the economic approach to harmonization is that legal diversity in 
principle is desirable, because different people may have different preferences regarding the 
goals of law, they may differ in wealth, in social norms et cetera. Uniform law, equally 
applying to everybody, is not able to take such differences into account. For example, 
countries with a higher national income per capita may prefer a higher safety standard or a 
different allocation of risks than less wealthy countries, for the simple reason that the level of 
safety and the allocation of risk influence the price of products and services, as well as the 
type of insurance necessary to cover those risks. Diverging social norms may impact what is 
regarded as desirable and acceptable behaviour, so that the legal norms governing this 
behaviour may differ per country or region. 
This idea was first expressed by Tiebout, who illustrated it by the choice of people where to 
locate. Depending on their preferences, one community will be more attractive to person A, 
while another community may be more attractive to person B. Tiebout argues that ‘the greater 
the number of communities and the greater the variance among them, the closer the consumer 
will come to fully realizing his preference position’.23 Under certain conditions (among which 
full information about the different communities and full mobility of consumers), people will 
move to the community which is best for them. The parallel to the topic of harmonization of 
law is clear: by having different legal systems co-existing, a greater number of preferences 
can be satisfied, because people can move to the jurisdiction which best fits their preferences 
(which is called ‘voting with their feet’). Alternatively, legislators may be induced to change 
the law if it turns out that competing jurisdictions meet the preferences of actors better. 
Wagner extensively discusses this idea and the assumptions made. In reality, people do not 
have full information about different jurisdictions. Furthermore, moving from one jurisdiction 
to another is anything but costless and it is unlikely that people would move to another 
Member State because they prefer the legal rules there. However, in areas of law such as 
contract law were it is possible to choose the applicable law, it may still be possible that the 
existence of different legal systems facilitates satisfaction of a greater number of preferences 
(provided that foreign law is recognized and enforced in domestic courts).24 In Wagners view, 
incomplete information about the different legal systems is still problematic, so that it is 
highly doubtful if choice of law can act as a substitute for voting with the feet.25
 
 
2. Enabling Learning Effects 
 
A second possible advantage of legal diversity is that competition between legal systems 
enables learning effects.26 Different solutions to similar problems and different interpretations 
of vague legal concepts may all yield valuable information of how legal rules influence 
human behaviour. It is therefore possible to learn from the solutions applied in other 
 
23 C.M. Tiebout, ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’, (64) Journal of Political Economy 1956, p. 418. 
24 Also see e.g. Ogus 1999, pp. 408, 416. 
25 Wagner 2002, pp. 1007-1011. 
26 See e.g. R.J. Van den Bergh, ‘Toward an Institutional Legal Framework for Regulatory Competition in 
Europe’, (53) Kyklos 2000, pp. 437, 438. 
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countries, which may help in finding a better solution in the domestic legal system.27 Van den 
Bergh describes the example of competition law, where different instruments may be used to 
assess the anti-competitive effects of market concentration. The fact that different experiences 
exist, enables improving competition law.28 It is also possible to ‘import’ legal concepts from 
other jurisdictions if they enable solving certain problems is a more satisfactory way. For 
example, the concept of ‘loss of a chance’ was already known in French law for a long time, 
before it was accepted in Dutch law.29  
Ogus explains that a possible spontaneous convergence due to these learning effects has an 
important advantage over imposed harmonization: the former will happen if the benefits of 
convergence exceed the costs. Imposed harmonization on the other hand, with the focus on 
the possible benefits of cost reduction, may have more costs (formulating uniform principles, 
adapting national legal systems, et cetera) than benefits (reduction in e.g. information costs).30
Obviously, this possibility of learning effects is lost in case of harmonized law. It is very 
doubtful if the centralized legislator is able to make up for this loss of learning possibilities by 
providing a higher quality of law. The next topic, limited information and the potential 
influence of interest groups, strengthens these doubts. 
 
 
3. Limited Information of the Legislator and Influence of Interest Groups 
 
There are additional reasons why legislation should take place at the lowest level possible, 
rather than at a higher level and hence also why competing national legal systems in principle 
are preferable to harmonized law (possible reasons why legislation should nonetheless take 
place at a higher level are discussed in Section 4.3). First, the ‘local’ legislator presumably 
will have better information regarding the local issues, problems and preferences than the 
legislator on a higher level. This implies that local regulation is better able than centralized 
legislation to deal with the issues and problems and to satisfy the preferences.31
 
The second issue is more complicated. The starting point is that regulators may be influenced 
by interest groups. Regulation hence does not by definition always serve ‘the general interest’ 
(whatever that may be) in an optimally balanced way. Interest groups, for example in the way 
in which they provide information to the regulator regarding the issue under regulation, may 
try to influence the regulator in such a way that the resulting regulation serves their private 
interests. As Wagner puts it: ‘the democratic process is surrounded by and embedded in a 
world of intensive rent-seeking behaviour of societal groups, fighting to secure legislation 
furthering their particular interests’.32 In order to try to reduce the possible problems caused 
by the influence of pressure groups, competition betweens different sets of regulations is 
preferred.  
There exists a complication, though. Regarding the topic of harmonization of law, some 
groups will have an interest in keeping non-harmonized law while others on the contrary 
 
27 Also see Wagner 2002, p. 1012. 
28 Van den Bergh 2000, p. 455. 
29 H.O. Kerkmeester and L.T. Visscher, ‘Learned Hand in Europe: a Study in the Comparative Law and 
Economics of Negligence’, German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2003, paper 6, p. 5. 
30 Ogus 1999, pp. 415-416. 
31 See e.g. M.G. Faure, ‘How Law and Economics May Contribute to the Harmonisation of Tort Law in Europe’, 
in: R. Zimmermann (ed), Grundstrukturen des Europäischen Deliktsrecht, Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft 2003, p. 38. 
32 Wagner 2002, p. 1000. 
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benefit from harmonization. This is the case irrespective of the answer to the question whether 
harmonization is desirable from a societal point of view. For example, academics specialized 
in their national legal system have different interests than academics specialized in 
international and comparative law.33 The same is true for practicing lawyers in the different 
fields of law.34 Furthermore, European bureaucrats, whose prestige and influence depends 
also on the level of centralization of lawmaking in Europe, have a private interest in 
harmonization. Finally, firms may have different interests. A firm located in a jurisdiction 
with a high level of consumer protection which has already spent resources on meeting those 
high demands will have an interest in avoiding harmonization which would lower the 
standard. After all, the fact that this firm already meets the demands is a competitive 
advantage when compared to potential newcomers who still have to invest.35 On the other 
hand, firms who already meet the more demanding requirements may benefit from 
harmonization which would increase the standard, because this forms a barrier to entry.36
Hence, even though the impact of interest groups is in principle an argument in favor of 
competition between legal systems, one should not forget that interest groups may oppose 
harmonization also in cases where there are good arguments for it.37 These arguments are 
discussed in the following section. 
 
 
4.3 Economic Arguments in Favor of Harmonization 
 
1. Internalizing Interstate Externalities 
 
In Section 4.2, the issue of satisfying a larger number of preferences has been discussed, 
which resulted in an argument for decentralized rulemaking. This argument, however, 
assumes that all costs and benefits of the regulation under consideration are borne by those 
living in the relevant jurisdiction. If costs of the regulation may be externalized to actors in 
other jurisdictions, social welfare may decrease because in deciding on the regulation, not all 
costs are taken into account. If, for example, country A would have lenient rules regarding 
protection of the environment and if the pollution caused by actors in country A would mainly 
materialize in country B (for example because the pollution is transported there through the 
air or through rivers), then the joint welfare of country A and B may increase if both countries 
together decide on the appropriate level of environmental protection.  
If voluntary negotiations between the countries involved do not result in the optimal outcome, 
for instance because property rights are not clearly defined or because parties behave 
strategically in negotiations, top-down harmonization may be required.38 However, first it has 
to be assessed whether national laws are able to cope with the externality. For example, in 
case of product liability, differences in the level of consumer protection in principle could 
result in an interstate externality, if producers in a lenient state would sell their (unsafe) 
 
33 Wagner 2002, p. 1012. 
34 Ogus 1999, p. 412. 
35 Van den Bergh 2003, pp. 448, 449. 
36 Faure 2003, p. 44. 
37 Ogus in this respect also argues that if interest groups could obstruct the process of competition between 
jurisdictions which could lead to spontaneous harmonization, mandatory harmonization may be required. Ogus 
1999, p. 416. 
38 See R. Van den Bergh, ‘Economic Criteria for Applying the Subsidiarity Principle in European Environmental 
Law’, in: R. Revesz, P. Sands and R. Stewart (eds), Environmental Law, the Economy, and Sustainable 
Development, Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press 2000, p. 80 ff. 
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products in other countries. However, given that the manufacturer can be held liable 
according to the law of the importing state, there is no problem of interstate externalities and 
hence no need form harmonization after all.39  
If national laws cannot cope with the problem adequately, regulation should take place on the 
level which is able to cover the area in which the externality exists.40
 
 
2. Avoid a ‘Race to the Bottom’ 
 
The basic argument of the ‘race to the bottom’ is that competition between jurisdictions may 
lead to ‘bad law’. The idea is that States, in deciding on regulation, may try to attract actors to 
their jurisdiction by offering rules which are attractive to them. For instance, by lowering the 
level of protection of employees, consumers and/or the environment et cetera, States try to 
attract firms, because this is to the benefit of the State (e.g. through more foreign investment 
and/or by increased tax returns). In competing with each other, States would continuously 
lower the standards of protection to become more attractive, which would result in very low 
standards which would only be to the benefit of firms. Centralization (including 
harmonization), so it is argued, may be necessary to avoid this problem.41
Besides the fact that it is difficult to argue on a theoretical level why competition between 
States would lead to adverse effects whereas competition in general is regarded positively,42   
empirical evidence for this alleged race to the bottom is also weak. Ogus offers some possible 
explanations. First, in order for the race to the bottom to occur in cases of negative interstate 
externalities, legislators have to find activities which generate ‘significant transborder effects 
but little or no domestic effects’.43 Second, it may be beneficial for firms to operate in 
jurisdictions with higher rather than lower standards, because this may induce them to 
technological improvements which provide competitive benefits. Ogus’ first point can be 
generalized: a race to the bottom may only occur if States are able to attract industry with 
lenient rules. Faure discusses this issue for environmental law, where firms may locate in 
‘pollution havens’ with low environmental standards. He shows, referring to a multitude of 
publications, that empirical support in this area again is weak: Pollution control costs are 
relatively low so that firms do not base their location decision on this issue; environmental 
regulation turns out not to induce existing firms to relocate, although location decisions of 
new firms may be influenced by it somewhat; other issues such as taxes, public services and 
the way in which the labor force is organized are much more important in the location 
decision. According to Faure, a ‘race to the top’ is more likely than a race to the bottom in 
cases of environmental liability, because States may choose to protect the interests of victims 
rather than industry and because more stringent rules may enable the States to sue for 
damages in cases of for example soil pollution.44 Similar doubts regarding the alleged race to 
the bottom hold for the topic of product liability. If harm occurs in export markets, the firm is 
liable according to the rules of those jurisdictions, and not to those of the more lenient 
exporting state. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether States can charge the industry for using 
lenient tort law. This is an important difference with the often-used example of corporate law 
 
39 Van den Bergh and Visscher 2006, pp. 518, 519. 
40 Faure 2003, p. 38. 
41 Wagner 2002, pp. 1003, 1004; Faure 2003, p. 47; Van den Bergh and Visscher 2006, pp. 519, 520. 
42 See e.g. R.L. Revesz, ‘Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the ‘Race-to-the-Bottom’ Rationale 
for Federal Environmental Regulation’ (67) New York University Law Review 1992, p. 1236 ff. 
43 Ogus 1994, p. 415. 
44 Faure 2003, pp. 48, 49. 
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where a large proportion of American firms incorporate in Delaware. Here, Delaware receives 
incorporation fees, but in the field of tort law there is no comparable benefit for States 
offering attractive rules.45 Of course, the mere fact that the firms locate in a jurisdiction 
already may be beneficial, because it may reduce unemployment, increase wages et cetera. 
This does not change the fact that empirical support for the race to the bottom argument is at 
best weak. Besides, even if harmonization would be justified by the danger of a race to the 
bottom, there still is the problem that not all States are equally strict in enforcing the 
regulation, so that differences between countries would still exist.46  
 
 
3. Decrease Transaction Costs and Profit from Scale Economies 
 
A last possible argument in favor of harmonization is that it may achieve economies of scale 
and it may reduce transaction costs. Scale economies exist if it is cheaper to have one 
(international) regulator rather than more lower-level regulators. This may be the case if the 
information that is required for regulation is not only relevant for one national jurisdiction, but 
also on a higher level, for example a group of countries or the entire European Union. Scale 
economies are likely important for the design of efficient rules of public law (such as product 
safety standards), but they may be much smaller, if not negligible, in other fields of law such 
as private law (including for example product liability).47
The transaction cost argument is closely related to the traditional legal argument of reducing 
legal uncertainty and reducing costs of international transactions, although that traditional 
legal argument is often set in the context of hindering cross-border trade. The line of 
reasoning is, in principle, quite simple. The currently existing differences in legal systems add 
to the costs of international transactions, for example of getting informed about the legal 
systems, of drawing different contracts for different countries, of litigation, et cetera. Wagner 
writes that ‘legal diversity places a tax on European business, a tax that creates no benefits 
either for firms or for consumers but only benefits for lawyers’.48 Even if firms would not be 
deterred from international transactions due to the higher costs caused by having to cope with 
different legal systems, there still would be such additional costs. Harmonization would 
reduce those costs, because one would not need to have knowledge of several different legal 
systems anymore. Again in the words of Wagner: ‘Harmonization would eliminate a 
considerable part of the transaction costs (…) and thus benefit society as a whole by 
abolishing a tax on international businesses.’49
 
Ribstein and Kobayashi distinguish several types of costs, which are reduced by uniformity:50
• Inconsistency costs: an actor which is active in several jurisdictions will have to meet the 
requirements posed by these different jurisdictions. These requirements will likely differ, 
 
45 Van den Bergh and Visscher 2006, p. 520. 
46 See e.g. K. Gatsios and P. Holmes, ‘Regulatory Competition’, in: P. Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the Law Volume 3, London: MacMillan Reference Limited 1998, p. 274. 
47 Van den Bergh 2000, p. 445; Van den Bergh and Visscher 2006, p. 521. 
48 Wagner 2002, p. 1014. 
49 Wagner 2002, p. 1017. 
50 L.E. Ribstein and B.H. Kobayashi, ‘An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws’, (25) Journal of Legal 
Studies 1996, p. 138 ff. Also see Ott and Schäfer 2002, p. 207 ff. and H. Wagner, ‘Economic Analysis of Cross-
Border Legal Uncertainty’, in: J. Smits (ed.), The Need for a European Contract Law. Empirical and Legal 
Perspectives, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 2005, pp. 31, 32. 
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which creates additional costs for the actor. Uniform law does not necessarily remove these 
costs, in as far as it is not applied and/or interpreted uniformly; 
• Information costs: actors need to determine the law which applies in every jurisdiction in 
which they are active. Uniform law reduces these costs because it is more clear which law 
applies, but also the interpretation may be easier if judicial decisions regarding the correct 
interpretation become available. Smits argues that the information costs only decrease if all 
relevant rules are unified, because otherwise the actor still has to get informed about the 
other relevant, non-unified rules.51 Ribstein and Kobayashi furthermore state that reduction 
of information costs is less relevant in situations where parties are able to choose the 
applicable law themselves; 
• Litigation costs: under uniform law, parties no longer need to deal with issues regarding 
choice of law, and also do not spend resources on forum shopping. Smits adds the point 
that parties no longer have to obtain information about how to bring a claim against the 
other party. In my view, this is already ‘covered’ under information costs; 
• Instability costs: if the law that governs a transaction changes, this forces the transacting 
parties to incorporate this change. According to Ripstein and Kobayashi, uniform law 
reduces these costs by focusing public attention on changes that reduce uniformity. Smits 
adds that information on changes in the uniform law will be more readily available than 
information on changes in a foreign legal system; 
• Externalities: this issue was already discussed above. Decentralized regulators may be able 
to enact legislation that serves the interests of the people living in its own jurisdiction, 
thereby externalizing costs on people outside the jurisdiction. Uniform law avoids this 
problem, because the legislator has to take the interests of all constituents in all 
jurisdictions into consideration. Possibilities of ‘voting with the feet’ and choice of law 
however limit the relevance of this cost-reducing ability of uniform law; 
• Drafting costs: uniform law making agencies can concentrate their resources on drafting 
particular laws and can hire experts in particular fields or in statutory drafting. 
Decentralized legislators on the other hand ‘are often part-time generalists who have little 
incentive to spend time finely crafting legislation in particular areas and lack resources to 
hire advisors’.52 Smits rightfully doubts whether this is an accurate description of the 
comparison between legislation on a European level and on the level of the Member 
States.53 
 
Obviously, these benefits of uniform law have to be compared with the costs thereof. Ribstein 
and Kobayashi in this respect discuss that regulatory competition enables satisfying a greater 
number of preferences, that it enables learning effects (they call this ‘innovation and 
experimentation’) and that local legislators have better information regarding the local 
conditions.54
 
There are several reasons why the potential of uniform law to save on transaction costs should 
not be overestimated.55 First, it is doubtful if harmonized law would indeed remove 
transaction costs to a large extent. After all, the harmonized rules will have to be translated 
 
51 Smits 2005, p. 168. 
52 Ribstein and Kobayashi 1996, p. 140. 
53 Smits 2005, p. 169. 
54 Ribstein and Kobayashi 1996, pp. 140, 141. 
55 See R. Van den Bergh, ‘Subsidiarity as an Economic Demarcation Principle and the Emergence of European 
Private Law’, (5) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 1998, pp. 146-148. 
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into the different languages of Member States. The interpretation of the provisions might not 
be the same in all member States, especially if vague concepts are used, so that differences 
still exist.56  
Second, the harmonization process itself causes transaction costs. Actors in all Member States 
have to switch from their own national legislation to the new, harmonized legislation. Smits 
argues that these costs are considerable. They include the costs of political decision making, 
of implementing the reform, and of adaptation to the new legislation (amending contracts, 
educating lawyers and judges, et cetera).57 Especially if differences between national 
legislations are rooted in the respective legal cultures, harmonization will be difficult and 
costly.58
 
 
5. Harmonization of Procedural Law from an Economic Perspective 
 
Looking at the role of civil procedures as discussed in Section 3 and the economic approach 
to harmonization which is treated in Section 4, it is now possible to bring both lines of 
reasoning together and to discuss harmonization of civil procedural law from an economic 
viewpoint. 
 
The point of departure has to be, just as with any other type of law, that economists in 
principle prefer diversity, because it enables satisfying a larger number of preferences, as well 
as a learning process towards ‘better law’. Hence, the subsidiarity principle from an economic 
point of view is not only relevant for substantive law, but also for procedural law. 
An additional reason why especially harmonization of procedural law may be problematic is 
the fact that it is so closely connected to the substantive law of the different countries. After 
all, civil procedures are the instruments with which rights and obligations which result from 
substantive law are enforced. Differences in substantive law, legal culture, the relative 
importance of public versus private enforcement and social norms may have a strong impact 
on procedural law. For example, in countries where consumers are predominantly regarded as 
‘weak’ parties that need protection against firms, procedural law may be used to strengthen 
this protection in the form of information duties for the defendant-firm, shifting the burden of 
proof, applying different statutes of limitation, et cetera to a larger extent than in countries 
where consumers are regarded as ‘normal’ parties in contractual settings who do not need 
additional protection. In tort law, the question whether certain risks are governed by strict 
liability or negligence, if proportional liability is accepted, what the required proof of for 
instance causation is (‘more likely than not’ or ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’), which losses are 
regarded as recoverable (think about issues such as pure economic loss, pain and suffering 
damages, hedonic damages in fatal accidents), all influence the way in which a trial is 
conducted. A last example regards difference in cost shifting rules. As was shown in Section 
3, these rules may impact civil procedures in many aspects, such as the decision to settle or 
sue, the resources spent on litigation, the quality of the claims being brought, et cetera. Cost 
shifting rules therefore have an impact on access to justice. The optimal rules on who 
ultimately bears litigation costs are strongly influenced by other issues, such as whether legal 
 
56 See e.g. Van den Bergh and Visscher 2006, p. 521. 
57 Smits 2005, p. 178. Also see e.g. D. Weber-Rey, ‘Harmonisation of European Insurance Contract Law’, in: S. 
Vogenauer en S. Weatherill (eds), The Harmonisation of European Contract Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing 
2006, p. 233. 
58 Faure 2003, pp. 59, 60. 
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expense insurance and/or subsidized legal aid is available, if fee arrangements are possible 
and what types of collective claims are possible. Hence, certain aspects of procedural law may 
be closely connected to many other aspects.59 In other words, there exists a strong ‘path 
dependency’ of procedural law. Harmonizing procedural law therefore might not only be even 
more difficult than harmonization of substantive law, it even is doubtful if harmonization of 
procedural law in these areas where substantive law differs, makes much sense. After all, the 
combination of substantive law and procedural law provides the behavioral incentives to 
actors. Procedural law is the instrument with which to effectuate claims arising from 
substantive law. Given the reservations Law and Economics has against harmonization of 
substantive law, it does not seem to make much sense to focus on harmonization of 
procedural law.  
Summarizing, differences in substantive law which reflect differences in preferences, social 
norms, et cetera make harmonization of procedural law with which substantive law is 
enforced, problematic. In order to be able to satisfy more preferences, it is preferable to allow 
actors to choose which legal system they want to apply to their relationship. Hence, choice of 
law is in principle preferred over harmonization. This nicely connects to the presentation 
which the Secretary General of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe gave at the 
2008 Conference on Civil Justice System in Europe of the Institute of European and 
Comparative Law, where he stresses the importance of subsidiarity and mutual recognition.60  
A possible ‘middle ground’ between the desire to harmonize on the one hand and the benefits 
of regulatory competition on the other hand can be reached by offering harmonized law as an 
additional choice. Especially in the debate on harmonization of contract law, this option is 
often mentioned as an attractive alternative.61 It enables parties to choose a legal system 
which is the same (or at least comparable) in different countries, but it does not force them to 
do so if they prefer specific national legislation. The European Order for Payment Procedure62 
and the European Small Claims Procedure63 provide examples of this idea in the area of 
procedural law. The fact that the proper functioning of the internal market, avoiding distortion 
of competition within the internal market and the need for Community legislation that 
guarantees a level playing-field for creditors and debtors throughout the European Union are 
all mentioned as rationales behind the regulation is not convincing from a Law and 
Economics point of view, as became clear in the above analysis of harmonization in general. 
However, Article 1 of the European Order for Payment Procedure states that it ‘shall not 
prevent a claimant from pursuing a claim (…) by making use of another procedure available 
under the law of a Member State or under Community law’ and article 1 of the European 
Small Claims Procedure states that it ‘shall be available to litigants as an alternative to the 
procedures existing under the laws of the Member States’. This optional character nicely fits 
into the economic line of reasoning, because regulatory competition is actually increased by 
 
59 Also see J.S. Parker, ‘Comparative Civil Procedure and Transnational “Harmonization”: A Law-and-
Economics Perspective’, George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series 2009, Paper 09-
03, p. 12. 
60 J. Goldsmith, ‘Civil Justice Systems, Choice of Forum and Choice of Contract Law in Europe’, available at 
http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/news/events_files/Civil_Justice_Systems,_Choice_of_Forum_and_Choice_of_Contr
act_Law_in_Europe_-_Jonathan_Goldsmith_.pdf [last visited August 31, 2010]. 
61 Although the danger exists that this ‘European option’ is chosen more often due to its prestige rather than its 
contents. 
62 Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council  of 12 December 2006 creating 
a European order for payment procedure, Official Journal of the European Union, L399/1. 
63 Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council  of 11 July 2007 establishing a 
European Small Claims Procedure, Official Journal of the European Union, L199/1. 
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adding an additional choice. Experience with how often this additional option is chosen, 
provides valuable information about the relative magnitude of the different costs and benefits 
associated with harmonization which were discussed above.  
 
The risk of a race to the bottom does not seem very realistic in the case of procedural law, 
especially now actors cannot directly choose the applicable procedural law but have to do this 
via the ‘detour’ of choice of forum. Such a race would imply that countries try to attract actors 
with cheap and quick procedures. This in itself is no problem and could even be seen as a race 
to the top. After all, if the costs of civil procedures, as well as the time involved in it decrease, 
transaction costs would go down, which is desirable. The economic approach to civil 
procedures as discussed in Section 3 strengthens this point, because private enforcement of 
law is necessary in order to provide actors with the correct behavioural incentives. Barriers to 
civil litigation therefore are undesirable. This holds even stronger for small claims, where low 
barriers can already result in rational apathy. It is therefore positive that the European Small 
Claims Procedure provides a relatively inexpensive procedure, which results in a judgment 
that is recognized and enforceable in other Member State without the need for a declaration of 
enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its recognition.  
Obviously, stimulating civil procedures should not go at the expense of the quality of the 
procedure. Low quality of civil procedures will itself result in costs (for instance the costs of 
appeal but also the costs of producing wrong behavioral norms), so that producing bad law is 
not attractive for countries anyway. In addition, it is doubtful whether countries would derive 
benefits from attracting international actors with ‘bad’ procedural law, besides stimulating 
their domestic legal profession. Furthermore, Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights poses several requirements on civil procedures, which further reduce the 
possibilities for a race to the bottom. The requirement of recognition and execution of foreign 
court rulings can also play a role in avoiding the race to the bottom problem. Hence, the race 
to the bottom argument is, to say the least, no more convincing than in the different areas of 
substantive law. 
 
The possible problem of interstate externalities does not play a role in procedural law, 
especially now the civil procedure takes place between the parties involved. Of course there is 
a positive externality of civil litigation in the sense that it produces behavioural norms which 
are also valid to actors who are not involved in the procedure. This is, however, not an 
interstate externality which calls for harmonization. On the contrary, given that the procedure 
can help in clarifying legal concepts, fine-tuning vague terms et cetera, it is important that the 
procedure fits the underlying substantive law and that all relevant circumstances of the case, 
including local circumstances, customs et cetera, are dealt with. Procedures that are 
specifically designed to fit these circumstances will probably result in better rulings than 
procedures which are based on a common denominator of several different systems. 
 
Given that harmonization of procedural law does not benefit from scale economies, especially 
now substantive law may differ per country, we have reached the last possible economic 
argument in favor of harmonization of procedural law: reduction of transaction costs. Clearly, 
on the one hand, harmonization of procedural law leads to a reduction of transaction costs, 
because lawyers from all countries involved no longer have to deal with and get informed 
about different legal systems. It is especially noteworthy that in the Commission 
Communication of European Contract Law, several responses stated that problems in the 
functioning of the internal market are not so much caused by differences in contract law, but 
more by language barriers, cultural differences, distance, habits, and divergence in other areas 
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of law, such as tax law and procedural law. Hence, procedural law is explicitly mentioned as a 
possible hurdle.  
However, it is far from certain that the transaction cost saving by harmonizing procedural law 
outweighs its costs. Given that the underlying substantive law still differs, it is very doubtful 
if harmonized procedural law truly leads to uniform law, or if differences in interpretation 
would still result in substantial non-uniformity. Furthermore, the transition from the currently 
existing systems of national procedural law to the new harmonized law also causes transaction 
costs. As was explained in Section 4, it remains to be seen if the reduction in transaction costs 
due to harmonization outweighs the costs of harmonization, including losing the possibility of 
learning effects and of satisfying a larger number of preferences. 
In the 2008 Oxford Civil Justice Survey of the Institute of European and Comparative Law it 
is examined ‘to what extent businesses in Europe were influenced by their perceptions of 
national civil justice systems and contract laws when choosing the applicable law and the 
forum of litigation for cross-border transactions’.64 From this Survey it becomes clear that 
many of the respondents find it very important (61%) or important (36%), when conducting 
cross-border transactions, to be able to choose the dispute resolution forum.65 With the 
statement that variations in European civil justice systems deter the respondent’s company 
from doing business in certain jurisdictions, 51% disagrees strongly, 25% disagrees mildly, 
19% agrees mildly and 1% agrees strongly.66 With the statement that such differences 
constitute, overall, a barrier to trade, 25% disagrees strongly, 35% disagrees mildly, 33% 
agrees mildly and 6% agrees strongly.67 In my view, these results suggest that the transaction 
cost saving argument does not outweigh the arguments in favor of regulatory competition. 
Granted, the respondents are positive about the idea of a harmonized European civil justice 
system (36% very favorably, 40% favorably, 19% not very favorably and 4% not at all 
favorably), especially because it reduces costs.68 However, only 22% would choose for the 
option of a European civil justice system which replaces national civil justice systems, while 
25% would choose for this European system to be an additional choice. Most respondents 
(37%) would opt for a greater alignment of civil justice systems.69
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Evaluated from an economic perspective, there do not seem to be many arguments in favor of 
harmonization of procedural law. In order to be able to learn from experiences and solutions 
in other jurisdictions, to meet more diverging preferences and to better connect procedural 
law to the underlying substantive law, clear rules regarding choice of law and regarding 
recognition and execution of foreign titles seems like a much better approach. In as far as 
‘best practices’ exist which could also be used in other jurisdictions, regulatory competition 
enables bottom-up harmonization because other jurisdictions may incorporate similar 
solutions. 
 
64 C. Hodges, S. Vogenauer and M. Tulibacka, ‘Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study’, 
University of Oxford Legal Research paper Series, Paper No 55/2009, p. 8. 
65 See Question 28 of the Survey, available at http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/iecl/ocjsurvey.shtml [last visited 
August 31, 2010]. 
66 See Question 41 of the Survey. 
67 See Question 42 of the Survey. 
68 See Question 43 and 46 of the Survey. 
69 See Question 45 of the Survey. 
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Does this mean that there is no scope for harmonization whatsoever? Not necessarily. In 
Section 5, the possibility of harmonized procedures as an additional option to choose from 
was already mentioned. This approach fits in an economic line of reasoning. Furthermore, as 
has become clear in the above sections, Law and Economics identifies the potential costs and 
benefits of harmonization. Generally speaking, the benefits seem to be restricted to possible 
transaction cost savings. The Oxford Civil Justice Survey suggests that differences in civil 
justice systems do not deter international trade, so it is questionable if the transaction cost 
savings outweigh the social costs of harmonization. 
For specific topics this may be different. For example, in case of uncontested pecuniary 
claims, the fact that the underlying substantive law which determines whether there is a debt 
and how large it is may differ, is irrelevant. After all, the debt is uncontested. Furthermore, 
given that there is no substantial precedent-value of rulings in such uncontested pecuniary 
claim cases, it is desirable to process such cases at the lowest possible costs. Hence, 
uncontested pecuniary claims are an area where the costs of harmonization are relatively low 
while the benefits may be substantial. However, it remains far from clear if the benefits 
outweigh the costs of shifting to a new system and if the centralized legislator is better able 
than the decentralized legislators to design an optimal system of handling uncontested 
pecuniary claims.  
The question whether the benefits of harmonization outweigh the costs is ultimately an 
empirical question which I cannot answer in this paper. The Oxford Civil Justice Survey 
suggests that differences between civil justice systems are a relevant factor for businesses, but 
they do not deter them from international trade, not are they generally regarded as a barrier to 
trade. In my opinion, the scope for harmonization of procedural law from a Law and 
Economics point of view hence is at best limited and it should have an optional character.  
 
